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Abstract
Background: "Pay for performance" is an incentive system that has been gaining acceptance in medicine and is 
currently being considered for implementation in dentistry. However, it remains unclear whether pay for performance 
can effect significant and lasting changes in provider behavior and quality of care. Provider acceptance will likely 
increase if pay for performance programs reward true quality. Therefore, we adopted a quality-oriented approach in 
reviewing those factors which could influence whether it will be embraced by the dental profession.
Discussion: The factors contributing to the adoption of value-based purchasing were categorized according to the 
Donabedian quality of care framework. We identified the dental insurance market, the dental profession position, the 
organization of dental practice, and the dental patient involvement as structural factors influencing the way dental 
care is practiced and paid for. After considering variations in dental care and the early stage of development for 
evidence-based dentistry, the scarcity of outcome indicators, lack of clinical markers, inconsistent use of diagnostic 
codes and scarcity of electronic dental records, we concluded that, for pay for performance programs to be 
successfully implemented in dentistry, the dental profession and health services researchers should: 1) expand the 
knowledge base; 2) increase considerably evidence-based clinical guidelines; and 3) create evidence-based 
performance measures tied to existing clinical practice guidelines.
Summary: In this paper, we explored factors that would influence the adoption of value-based purchasing programs 
in dentistry. Although none of these factors were essential deterrents for the implementation of pay for performance 
programs in medicine, the aggregate seems to indicate that significant changes are needed before this type of 
program could be considered a realistic option in dentistry.
Background
Rising costs [1] and variable quality [2] are two of the
major challenges faced today by the United States (US)
healthcare system. Increasing expenditures without con-
comitant improvements in public health [3] convinced
stakeholders to request more transparency and account-
ability for their healthcare dollars [4-6]. "Pay-for-perfor-
mance" (P4P) is a group of value-based purchasing
programs that attempt to link provider reimbursement to
improvements in healthcare quality. A widely used con-
cept of healthcare that underlies many P4P programs
defines quality as "doing the right thing, at the right time,
in the right way delivered to the right patient [7]".
In recent years, the concept of paying providers or pro-
vider groups for achieving better marks on quality indica-
tors has become common [8,9]. Incentive schemes are
now routinely used by managed care organizations
(MCOs) and public programs in the US. In a recent study,
Rosenthal et al. [10] found that 126 of 225 MCOs, repre-
senting more than 80% of managed care enrollees, use
P4P programs in their provider contracts [10]. In 2007,
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported that there were
over 100 reward and incentive programs within Medicare
in the US [11]. Although still largely experimental, the
number of initiatives is growing.
P4P programs have been widely adopted despite the
fact that they are based on several unproven assumptions.
One is that providers' clinical behavior can actually be
changed using financial incentives. Some evidence sug-
gests payment method affects provider behavior [12,13],
but these reports may have limited generalizability and
the impact on quality has not been reported [14-16]. Sev-
eral systematic reviews concluded that more research is
needed in the area of provider payments. Gosden et al
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[15] found that compared to capitation, fee-for-service
was associated with providing more primary care ser-
vices, but the impact on the quantity of specialty services
was mixed. Moreover, fee-for-service was associated with
lower patient satisfaction with access to a physician com-
pared with salary payment. Other studies found no evi-
dence that performance payments were associated with
improved primary health care [16,17].
A second assumption is that a link exists between P4P
indicators and true improvements in quality. Rosenthal
and Frank found little evidence of the effectiveness of
paying for quality in healthcare [18]. For example, assess-
ing risk factor levels, a process indicator, is not associated
with reducing risk factor levels. Mangione et al [19] found
that disease management strategies were associated with
better processes of diabetes care but not with improved
intermediate outcomes. Only by ameliorating the actual
risk factors can health be impacted. This issue is further
complicated by the impact on clinical outcomes of
numerous patient factors that are not incorporated into
quality of care indicators. Moreover, P4P may lead to
"gaming" by providers, who may recruit the types of
patients who tend to have better outcomes and be com-
pensated for their "performance" rather than providing
better quality of care. Provider manipulation has been a
challenge confronting the British experiment with P4P
[17,20].
Lastly, P4P systems assume that payers can accurately
determine which components of care could be positively
and negatively impacted by financial incentives and
design a payment program whose benefits will outweigh
any unintended consequences [21]. But, despite its appeal
as a payment method, P4P has proven extremely com-
plex, hard to devise and difficult to implement [22,23]. In
addition, there are conflicting results about P4P impact
on quality [24-26], ethical concerns [27,28], and mixed
provider acceptance [29]. Despite these problems, P4P
continues to expand.
Although initially designed for medical care, it is possi-
ble tha t P4P will also be consider ed for dentistry . T he
American Dental Association (ADA) has already issued a
statement on the prerequisites for acceptance of a P4P
program by the profession and closely monitors all
related national legislative proposals [30]. History shows
that the dental profession often follows in the footsteps of
medicine. For example, electronic records and evidence-
based care are gaining acceptance by the dental profes-
sion after becoming routine in medicine. However, differ-
ences in the delivery and payment for medical and dental
services must be considered before implementing P4P in
dentistry.
Discussion
A growing body of literature describes value purchasing
programs and their implementation in various healthcare
systems [9,31,32]. Although provider incentives differ by
healthcare system and P4P program, significant design
and implementation obstacles exist in every country
where P4P was implemented [33,34]. Despite the focus of
this analysis on the American system of dentistry, the fac-
tors influencing the P4P adoption exist in various degrees
in other dental healthcare systems as well.
Providing evidence that P4P improves dental care qual-
ity, limits costs, or both, would strengthen the case for its
introduction. However, no such evidence existed prior to
implementation of P4P in medicine. Since the adoption of
value-based purchasing depends on provider involve-
ment, this analysis presents possible challenges of imple-
menting P4P in dentistry from a quality-of-care
perspective. One might expect greater provider accep-
tance if P4P programs are proven to actually reward qual-
ity. Thus, we will focus our discussion on the quality
aspect of performance-based programs and examine the
factors which could influence whether P4P is adopted in
dentistry. However, to aid in explaining factors that need
to be addressed before P4P is adopted in dentistry, we
categorize these factors according to the classic quality of
care framework by Donabedian [35], in which quality is
evaluated using structure, process and outcomes parame-
ters.
1. Structural factors
The Insurers
The structure of dental insurance is a major contributing
factor in the implementation on any value-based plan.
For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), dental care is
largely covered by the National Health Services (NHS).
Consequently, payment policy changes involving P4P
may have a greater influence on UK dental providers than
programs in other healthcare systems. In the US, public
insurance for dental services is extremely limited; thus,
any payment policy initiatives by public payers will have
limited impacts on mainstream private dental practice.
Moreover, an estimated 44% of adults do not have any
dental coverage [36]. The high percentage of out-of-
pocket payments in dental practices and the multitude of
different insurers per practice diminish the insurers'
negotiation power and make the acceptance of perfor-
mance-based payment programs by dental providers
more difficult. Thus, the adoption of P4P in dentistry will
be a difficult public policy issue because it would largely
have to be implemented by the private sector. This could
significantly change if US healthcare reform mandates a
certain level of dental services or if the dental insurance
market becomes more concentrated.
Variations in service coverage among dental insurance
plans complicates matters. This can create a dissonance
between the realities of the dental reimbursement system
and the very few clinical practice guidelines that do exist.
For instance, some plans do not cover dental sealants.Voinea-Griffin et al. BMC Oral Health 2010, 10:9
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The current procedure-based payment for dental services
is based on delivery of procedures, which may reward
over-treatment of covered procedures. This financial
aspect of dental care delivery may be one of the biggest
reasons for the delay in P4P in dentistry.
The Profession
Both dentists in the community and dental organizations
may be substantially affected by the implementation of
any P4P program. Consequently, professional organiza-
tions have a direct interest in P4P initiatives. Loss of con-
trol, cookbook care, inadequate quality assessment
standards, and finance-driven practice are common pro-
fessional concerns. To address them, in 2006 the ADA
released a position statement on value-based purchasing
entitled "Principles for Pay for Performance or Other
Third-Party Financial Incentive Programs [30]". The
ADA represents about 69% of US dentists [37]. Ten prin-
ciples laid out in this document reflect the profession's
desire to preserve decisional autonomy and payer's non-
interference in the dentist-patient relationship. The doc-
ument emphasizes dentists' interest in having quality as
the goal of any financial-incentive program, in maintain-
ing patients' access to quality care, and in allowing all P4P
participation to be voluntary. Moreover, the document
expressed a goal that quality indicators should be mini-
mum in number, standard, accepted, clear, measurable,
and able to factor in patient risk and compliance. The
ADA does not currently provide quality indicators on its
website, but does list these components of care: 1) infec-
tion control; 2) toxic exposure control; 3) medical emer-
gency procedures; 4) access; 5) privacy; 6) safety; and 7)
patient record and documentation. These parameters are
merely descriptors of care and not intended for policy
development [38]. In addition, ADA House resolution 24
states that any P4P program in dentistry will be chal-
lenged due to lack of "generally accepted/universal, credi-
ble quality guidelines developed by the profession" [30].
Specialist dental associations have not taken a public
position on value-based purchasing, possibly due to the
fact that a smaller share of specialists' revenue comes
from insurance sources [36], and because the current
focus of insurers is on primary care rather than specialty
care. An exception is the American Association of Oral
and Maxillofacial Surgeons, whose members perform
Medicare-reimbursed procedures and will likely be the
first dental specialty affected by P4P. The Association is
interested in securing fair reimbursement for its mem-
bers and emphasizes the need for "complete and accurate
measurement of the Oral Maxillofacial Surgeons' work
value" [39].
The Dental Practice
Differences in how medical and dental providers are
organized play a significant role in the adoption of quality
improvement programs and the potential for P4P imple-
mentation. Sixty-five percent of US dental practices are
owned and operated by solo practitioners [40,41] as
opposed to only about 24% in the medical field [39]. Few
MCOs include a dental plan, and large provider groups
are less common in dentistry than in medicine [36]. Pro-
vider interaction in large physician groups is instrumen-
tal to quality improvement [42], but is rarely seen in
dentistry [43]; as a result, dental quality initiatives are
limited in number and scope and not widely reported in
the literature [44-47]. Moreover, quality initiatives in
medicine are guideline-based, while in dentistry, peer
review is preferred [48], and guidelines are relatively few
in number. The lack of information about quality pro-
grams and the predominance of solo practice may signifi-
cantly inhibit the adoption of P4P in dentistry.
The Dental Patient
Equally affected but apparently the least involved party in
P4P dental programs are the dental patients themselves.
The urgency for quality improvement which drove the
implementation of P4P in medicine is not currently pres-
ent in dentistry. Despite limited insurance coverage and
wide-spread oral disease, out-of-pocket expenses for den-
tal services are relatively low compared to medical care
costs and expected by consumers. This apparent imbal-
ance of the cost-to-value relationship for most people will
not be addressed by any P4P system. Thus, it is unlikely
that the consumers will organize and demand increased
scrutiny on dental services as they have done for medical
care.
2. Process of care factors
Variation in dental care
There is considerable variation in dental treatment
modalities, and this variation is difficult to attribute to
the types of patients cared for [49,50]. For example, the
use of sealants varies greatly among dentists, although
overwhelming evidence about their effectiveness exists
[51,52]. There is also wide variation in the way early car-
ies are treated [53], despite research proving that remin-
eralization of enamel caries is possible and recommended
[51,54]. Two-stage therapy, pre- and post-puberty, for
severe Class II malocclusion (prominent front teeth) is
still preferred by many orthodontists, despite evidence
that the one-stage treatment is shorter, less costly and has
the same results [55]. In response to such observations,
Bader and Shugars [53,56] suggested that comprehensive
approaches to improving consistency across the dental
profession would improve quality more than traditional
methods, which have typically focused on outlier den-
tists.
Another possible explanation for the observed differ-
ences in care is the inadequate dissemination of recent
scientific evidence. Although this might be the case for
some dentists, the marginal improvements obtainedVoinea-Griffin et al. BMC Oral Health 2010, 10:9
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through provider interventions based solely on education
[57] suggest that additional reasons for observed differ-
ences exist. Clinical inertia, defined as "recognition of a
problem but not acting to treat or prevent the problem in
the desired manner based on current evidence" [58], may
contribute to delays in the large-scale implementation of
recommended care and has been offered as an alternative
explanation for observed variations. A notable example is
the use of dental sealants, estimated to prevent 80% of pit
and fissure caries and promoted by the ADA since 1976.
After 30 years, countless educational programs and
mounting evidence, the dental profession has achieved a
mere 50% of children receiving this service [59]. Similarly,
third molar prophylactic extractions continue to be rec-
ommended despite evidence against this treatment [60].
Other compelling explanations for the existing varia-
tion in care exist. Studies have shown that the distribu-
tion of dental services is different when payment
methodology changes [61,62]. In addition, the variation
in treatment decisions has significant cost implications
[50], which seem to be due at least in part to the paucity
of evidence regarding many common dental treatments
[63].
Evidence-Based Dentistry
Implementing a P4P program has been shown to reduce
variation in medical care [64,65]. Clinical guidelines,
defined by the IOM as "systematically developed state-
ments to assist practitioner and patient decisions about
appropriate health care for specific clinical circum-
stances" [66], may reduce the variation in the delivery of
care. In general, guidelines are developed based on evi-
dence or expert opinion, absent sufficient evidence,
According to the ADA, evidence-based dentistry is "an
approach to oral health care that requires the judicious
integration of systematic assessments of clinically rele-
vant scientific evidence, relating to the patient's oral and
medical condition and history, with the dentist's clinical
expertise and the patient's treatment needs and prefer-
ences" [67].
Dentistry has an abundance of published research but
in most areas lacks the strong evidence that comes from
randomized controlled trials. The ADA has begun to
advocate for the practice of evidence-based dentistry, and
to educate dentists about best practices [67,68]. Yet, the
ADA lags behind other organizations in providing den-
tists with clinical guidance (Table 1). On its web page, the
ADA has links to 89 topics, each with several literature
reviews, but none endorsed by the organization. Within
the posted reviews, many reports cite insufficient evi-
dence. For example, single crown restorations were
reported to be the most frequent dental procedure after
prophylaxis and periodic oral evaluation [69]. Of the six
reviews addressing various aspects of single crown resto-
rations in permanent teeth, four report insufficient evi-
dence, whereas the other two report only fair evidence.
The ADA makes evidence-based clinical recommenda-
tions in only three areas: (1) prevention of infective endo-
carditis, (2) use of sealants and (3) professionally-applied
topical fluoride.
The dearth of evidence-based recommendations for
dental care can also be illustrated by the following exam-
ples. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) develops and posts evidence-based practice
reports on its webpage. Of the 159 reports, only 1 is den-
tistry-related and reports insufficient evidence to
strongly recommend its implementation. The US Preven-
tive Services Task Force is an independent panel of
experts in primary care and prevention sponsored by the
AHRQ to review the evidence. This group rates the
strength of that evidence, and submits its recommenda-
tions. Of the posted 103 recommendations, 2 are den-
tistry-related, of which only one was rated to have
sufficient evidence to recommend the practice [70] (Table
2). Similarly, the Cochrane Collaborative Group reviewed
82 topics on oral health [71] and found insufficient evi-
dence on many of them. Under this circumstance, identi-
fying best evidence and incorporating it in the daily
clinical practice is challenging and it is not systematically
done by many dentists [72].
Table 1: Stomatognathic Clinical Guidelines in the National 
Guideline Clearinghouse™
Clinical guidelines directly related to the practice of 
dentistry
No.
American Dental Association 2
American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry 22
American Cleft Palate Craniofacial Association 1
American Academy of Pediatrics 1
American Academy of Sleep Apnea 1
Center for Disease Control 1
US Preventive Services Task Force 2
New York State Department of Health 2
Health Partners 4
University of Texas at Austin 1
Non US Government Agencies 8
Areas covered by other stomatognathic clinical 
guidelines
Preventive Services 12
Cancer 3
Infectious Diseases 7
TOTAL 67Voinea-Griffin et al. BMC Oral Health 2010, 10:9
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A change in culture regarding quality improvement in
the medical profession started, although it has not yet
been embraced by all physicians [73]. A similar change
will be necessary before any P4P programs could be real-
istically considered in dentistry.
3. Outcome factors
Outcome indicators
Quality assessment is a prerequisite for quality improve-
ment. Compared with outcomes, structure and processes
are easier to measure and most quality improvement ini-
tia tives re ly hea vily on t his type of indica t or . Y et, high
quality structure and processes do not necessarily result
in high quality outcomes. Outcome indicators have been
the most difficult to develop and measure [74]. A study
on the development of effectiveness of care using dental
plan data resulted in 7 measures, 3 of which were out-
come measures [75]. Despite reasonably reliability and
sensitivity, the large scale adoption of these measures to
evaluate providers' performance was hindered by reliance
on and limitation of diagnostic information in the admin-
istrative datasets.
Currently there are very few clinical outcomes indica-
tors in dentistry. Among them are the Decayed, Missing,
Filled Surfaces (DMFS), Periodontal Index, Gingival
Bleeding Index, and Oral Hygiene Index. Of the 352 out-
comes indicators publicly available on the National Qual-
ity Measures Clearinghouse, only 9 are related to oral and
dental diseases and 3 are clinical outcome indicators rele-
vant to the practice of dentistry [76] (Table 3).
Clinical markers
One factor which makes the development of outcomes
indicators particularly challenging in dentistry is the
prevalence of chronic dental conditions, which do not
have established severity markers as do chronic medical
conditions like diabetes or hypertension. For diabetes
management, the hemoglobin A1c level is an established
indicator of disease control. Blood pressure is used for
hypertension control. Such indicators do not exist for
managing dental caries, which is the most prevalent dis-
ease in dentistry. Caries progress slowly and they are typ-
ically treated by several dentists over decades. Moreover,
most dentists do not currently record clinical information
needed for outcomes assessment, such as caries depth,
caries activity, change in caries rate, caries risk assess-
ment, patient symptoms and past treatments including
preventive treatments. Other quality indicators such as
biological and psychosocial outcomes are rarely recorded
[77]. Thus, it is difficult to create and validate meaningful
outcome indicators and enhance the level of evidence in
the treatment of caries and other chronic dental condi-
tions.
Diagnostic codes
Procedure codes developed by the ADA [78] are widely
accepted by third-party payers for reimbursement for
dental services in the US. However, unlike medicine, no
standardized diagnostic codes exist for dentistry except
the ones developed by MCOs within their networks.
Without insurers' mandates to submit specific diagnostic
information, and due to the time constraints of busy den-
tal practices, this information is regularly absent from
dental charts. This omission considerably limits the value
of any retrospective clinical information and makes risk
adjustment and outcome assessment very difficult. While
an ideal P4P program would reward clinical outcomes,
the great majority of medical P4P programs now reward
processes of care that are thought to lead to better out-
comes. Any dental P4P programs will likely make similar
concessions and focus on process until outcomes assess-
ments can be made more feasible. Thus, a P4P program
Table 3: Clinical outcome indicators for pediatric 
restorative dentistry 
Indicator
Percentage of deciduous teeth extracted (for pathological 
reasons) within 6 months following pulpotomy treatment, 
during the time period under study.
Percentage of teeth requiring re-treatment (restoration, 
endodontic or extraction, but not including Pit & Fissure 
Sealants) within 24 months of the initial fissure sealant treatment.
Percentage of teeth requiring repeat fissure sealant treatment 
within 24 months of the initial fissure sealant treatment.
Table 2: Dental care evidence reports and 
recommendations 
AHRQ Evidence report Level of Evidence
Effectiveness of Antimicrobial Adjuncts 
to Scaling and Root Planning Therapy 
for Periodontitis
Insufficient
USPSTF Recommendations Level of Evidence
The USPSTF recommends that primary 
care clinicians prescribe oral fluoride 
supplementation at currently 
recommended doses to preschool 
children older than 6 months of age 
whose primary water source is deficient 
in fluoride.
Fair
The USPSTF concludes that the 
evidence is insufficient to recommend 
for or against routine risk assessment of 
preschool children by primary care 
clinicians for the prevention of dental 
disease.
InsufficientVoinea-Griffin et al. BMC Oral Health 2010, 10:9
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currently could only measure performance through
structure, process, patient satisfaction, or attainment of
financial goals. Use of clinical outcome measures will
only be possible if additional data were submitted by den-
tists.
Electronic dental records
Other important issues in developing outcome indicators
are the availability of valid, reliable treatment information
and the cost of data collection. Data is valuable as long as
it accurately measure clinical reality i.e. actual oral health
status, risk factors, diagnoses, treatment, and side effects.
Missing data in patient records makes the calculation of
performance measures based on dental records difficult
[79]. Currently, many dental offices use paper records and
collect electronic data only for reimbursement purposes.
Assessing performance based on electronic claims infor-
mation would therefore provide an incomplete picture of
clinic activity and thereby limit quality of care informa-
tion [80]. It may be possible to assess at a practice level
the proportion of patients who receive dental sealants,
but the diagnostic information on the type of caries and
appropriateness of treatment for a particular patient
would not be available in claims data. Modifications of
the claims codes could address this issue to some extent,
but such modifications are not easy to implement and
uptake may be variable if reimbursement is not directly
tied to the new codes. Absent robust administrative data
systems, other performance evaluation methods have
been tested [79]. While many MCOs justify the cost of
medical records abstraction required to participate in the
voluntary Healthcare Data Information Set (HEDIS) pub-
lic reporting program, the high costs of data abstraction
would be a barrier to implementation for individual prac-
tices. It will likely be several years before a Universal Elec-
tronic Medical Record is adopted and even longer for its
dental equivalent. In the meantime, dental P4P program
designers must weigh the imperfections of claims data
against the feasibility of primary data collection modeled
on HEDIS.
In conclusion, dentistry is not ready to follow primary
care in implementing value-based purchasing programs.
The key elements of a P4P program in general medicine
have been identified and can be operationalized: clear
objectives, definable units of assessment, valid perfor-
mance indicators, analysis and interpretation of perfor-
mance data, performance standards and financial
rewards [19]. These elements have not been developed in
dentistry yet. Future research is needed to address these
issues and to demonstrate a link between financial
rewards and performance improvement for dental care.
Summary
Dentistry may follow medicine by implementing P4P pro-
grams to improve dental care quality. P4P may take lon-
ger to penetrate dentistry than medicine, due to
differences between medical and dental practice, insur-
ance coverage, the dearth of evidence-based guidelines
for common dental interventions, and a resultant paucity
of evidence-based performance measures. Broad adop-
tion of P4P programs will require the dental profession
and health services researchers to: 1) expand the evidence
base; 2) create evidence-based clinical guidelines; and 3)
create evidence-based performance measures tied to the
existing clinical practice guidelines. P4P in dentistry
would be a major policy change for the dental profession
and the public alike. Based on our review of the literature
on evidence-based dentistry and US dental practice pat-
terns, implementing P4P for dental care at this point
appears to be premature.
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